Here are Aristotle’s “predicables” explained:

1. Definition or Species: a statement of the things essence (to ti en einai or “that which makes it what it is”). Aristotle called this “horos” or “definition.” Porphyry referred to this as “eidos” or “form.” Boethius introduced into the Latin tradition as  “species.” It denotes the specific essence of a thing.
2. Genus: Genus is that part of the essence which is also predicable of other things different from them in kind. The key to understand “genus” is that it is “general.” For example the “genus” of a triangle would be that it is a “shape.”
3. Differentia: that which distinguishes one species from another within a genus. The square species and triangle species are differentiated from one another within the shape genus by the number of their sides. Triangles have three. Squares have four.
4. Propria: A “property” is an attribute which is common to all the members of a class, but is not part of its essence or definition. The fact that the interior angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles is not part of the definition, but is universally true.
5. Accidentia: An accident is an attribute which may or may not belong to a subject. With a “green triangle” the color green is “accidental” – it is not something essential to “triangle-ness.”

Leave a comment if you need more help.

1, “Big” Alpha – “first philosophy” as the science of the first principles or causes of things

2, “Little” Alpha – method and rejection of infinite regresses

3, Beta – list of metaphysical “aporiai” or puzzles

4, Gamma – logical assumption of the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Principle of the Excluded Middle

5, Delta – Aristotle’s Dictionary of Terms (just remember “delta” does with “dictionary”)

6, Epsilon – Metaphysics is the study of being as being and thus it is Theology (study of God/gods), because the highest substance (God) is the Principle of all Being.

7, Zeta – Aristotle lists four candidates for being/ousia/substance as 1) subject, 2) universal, 3) genus, and 4) essence.

8, Eta

9, Theta

10, Iota – One and many, sameness and difference.

11, Kappa – Review of things said already and of things stated in Aristotle’s Physics.

12, Lambda – The “Theology” Book. Aristotle examines the first principles or “gods”. Aristotle discusses the unmoved mover(s).

13, Mu – Mathematics and numbers

14, Nu – Mathematics and numbers continued

This list is derived from Marc Cohen’s article “Aristotle’s Metaphysics” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

•    accident: sumbebêkos (kata sumbebhko,j)
•    accidental: kata sumbebêkos (kata sumbebhko,j)
•    account: logos
•    actuality: energeia, entelecheia
•    alteration: alloiôsis
•    affirmative: kataphatikos
•    assertion: apophansis (sentence with a truth value, declarative sentence)
•    assumption: hupothesis
•    attribute: pathos
•    axiom: axioma
•    be: einai
•    being(s): on, onta
•    belong: huparchein
•    category: katêgoria
•    cause: aition, aitia
•    change: kinêsis, metabolê
•    come to be: gignesthai
•    coming to be: genesis
•    contradict: antiphanai
•    contradiction: antiphasis (in the sense “contradictory pair of propositions” and also in the sense “denial of a proposition”)
•    contrary: enantion
•    definition: horos, horismos
•    demonstration: apodeixis
•    denial (of a proposition): apophasis
•    dialectic: dialektikê
•    differentia: diaphora; specific difference, eidopoios diaphora
•    distinctive: idios, idion
•    end: telos
•    essence: to ti ên einai, to ti esti
•    essential: en tôi ti esti, en tôi ti ên einai (of predications); kath’ hauto (of attributes)
•    exist: einai
•    explanation: aition, aitia
•    final cause: hou heneka (literally, “what something is for”)
•    form: eidos, morphê
•    formula: logos (lo,goj)
•    function: ergon
•    genus: genos
•    homonymous: homônumon
•    immediate: amesos
•    impossible: adunaton
•    in respect of itself: kath’ hauto
•    individual: atomon, tode ti
•    induction: epagôgê
•    infinite: apeiron
•    kind: genos, eidos
•    knowledge: epistêmê
•    matter: hulê
•    movement: kinêsis
•    nature: phusis
•    negation (of a term): apophasis
•    particular: en merei, epi meros (of a proposition); kath’hekaston (of individuals)
•    peculiar: idios, idion
•    per se: kath’ hauto
•    perception: aisthêsis
•    perplexity: aporia
•    possible: dunaton, endechomenon; endechesthai (verb: “be possible”)
•    potentially: dunamei
•    potentiality: dunamis
•    predicate: katêgorein (verb); katêegoroumenon(“what is predicated”)
•    predication: katêgoria (act or instance of predicating, type of predication)
•    principle: archê (starting point of a demonstration)
•    qua: hêi
•    quality: poion
•    quantity: poson
•    refute: elenchein, refutation, elenchos
•    separate: chôriston (cwristo,n)
•    said in many ways: pollachôs legetai
•    science: epistêmê
•    soul: psuchê
•    species: eidos
•    specific: eidopoios (of a differentia that “makes a species”, eidopoios diaphora)
•    subject: hupokeimenon (u`pokei,menon)
•    substance: ousia (ouvsia)
•    term: horos
•    this: tode ti (to,de ti)
•    universal: katholou (both of propositions and of individuals)
•    wisdom: sophia

“It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there of the participant is different from what he says in his so-called unwritten teaching.”

- Aristotle, Physics 209b

This secret teaching conforms to something said by Plato in his Seventh Letter:

“Every serious man in dealing with really serious subjects carefully avoids writing” (344c).

So what is this secret “unwritten doctrine” of Plato? I can’t write it down. Come to class and find out…

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Commentaria in Aristotelem.

The picture above is part of an image of Saint Thomas Aquinas “confounding” the Muslim philosopher Averroës (Arabic: Ibn Rushd). The whole thing is depicted below. Averroës and Aquinas both studied Aristotle, but Aquinas showed that Aristotle could be reconciled with Christianity. To do this, Aquinas had to correct what he considered to be “misinterpretations” of Aristotle made by Averroës.

In case you’re wondering, that’s Averroës on the floor below Aquinas. Apparently he’s been TKO’ed by Aquinas’ mental powers. Or he may just be sleeping, because he’s so bored. You decide.

Many believe that the hand gestures of Plato and Aristotle (in the center of the painting) denote two ways of doing metaphysics. Plato points to the heavens–Aristotle to the earth. If look closely, Plato is holding a book: Timaeus, one of his most celestial and abstract dialogues. Aristotle is holding his Nichomachean Ethics, a rather terrestrial treatise.

Here are the philosophers featured by Raphael in the Scuola di Atene by number:

1: Zeno of Citium 2: Epicurus 3: Federico II of Mantua? 4: Boethius or Anaximander or Empedocles?

5: Averroes 6: Pythagoras 7: Alcibiades or Alexander the Great? 8: Antisthenes or Xenophon? 9: Hypatia 10: Aeschines or Xenophon?

11: Parmenides? 12: Socrates 13: Heraclitus (as Michelangelo) 14: Plato (as Leonardo da Vinci) 15: Aristotle

16: Diogenes of Sinope? 17: Plotinus? 18: Euclid or Archimedes with students 19: Strabo or Zoroaster? 20: Ptolemy? R: Apelles (as Raphael) 21: Protogenes

For the all the ladies, the only woman to make it into the painting was Hypatia who is located at #9.

1.    Substance (ousia, “essence” or “substance”). Substance is defined as that which neither can be predicated of anything nor be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates.
2.    Quantity (poson, “how much”). This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period.
3.    Quality (poion, “of what kind or quality”). This is a determination which characterizes the nature of an object.
4.    Relation (pros ti, “toward something”). This is the way in which one object may be related to another.
5.    Place (pou, “where”). Position in relation to the surrounding environment.
6.    Time (pote, “when”). Position in relation to the course of events.
7.    Position (keisthai, “to lie”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.
8.    State or habitus (echein, “to have”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one’s shoes, one’s arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”).
9.    Action (poiein, “to make” or “to do”). The production of change in some other object.
10.    Affection (paschein, “to suffer” or “to undergo”). The reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to mean a kind of emotion or passion.

List modified from Robin Smith’s excellent article “Aristotle’s Logic” from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy